This paper addresses a very European issue, the consolidation of securities trading and settlement infrastructures. We analyse in a two-country model welfare implications of different types of consolidation. It is shown that in our model, horizontal integration of settlement systems is better than vertical integration of exchanges and settlement systems, but vertical integration is still better than no consolidation. Though model-based, these Þndings have clear policy implications with regards to the highly fragmented European securities infrastructure.
Introduction
The European securities trading and settlement infrastructure is highly fragmented. There are over 20 national exchanges and about as many central securities depositories (CSDs) in the EU. Market participants, central banks and regulators agree that consolidation is desirable. However, there is little agreement on what kind of consolidation would be optimal. Some people prefer vertical integration, i.e. mergers of exchanges with CSDs (and clearing houses). Others favour horizontal integration of different exchanges or different CSDs. In practice, all kinds of integration have been taking place in recent years. In Italy and in a similar way in Germany, the exchange (, the clearing house) and the CSD have been merged to form a so-called vertical silo. The merger of the exchanges of France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal have created Euronext. The CSDs of France, the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium have been merged into Euroclear Group.
In this paper, we try to shed some light on the pros and cons of the different types of consolidation in a theoretical model. However, before we describe some basic features of our model and our main Þndings, it is important to summarize a few institutional characteristics of the interaction between securities exchanges and CSDs.
Securities exchanges and CSDs play essential roles in all major securities markets. Exchanges help to match buyers and sellers. CSDs are central store houses for securities. In most countries, there is only one CSD and almost all securities issued under the country's legislation are stored there for their entire life -as physical papers or increasingly often electronically. Furthermore, CSDs maintain records establishing ownership of securities. Major Þnancial institutions have securities accounts with the CSD and the account balances indicate the securities owned by the respective Þnancial institution (or its direct or indirect clients). Finally, CSDs act as major settlement service providers, i.e. they organize the transfer of securities from a seller to a buyer. If one Þnancial institution sells securities to another, the transaction is settled by book entries in the book of the CSD: The seller's account with the CSD is debited and the buyer's account is credited.
Exchanges and CSDs cooperate closely. Most exchanges use for reasons of costs or for legal reasons only one CSD to settle all trades executed on the exchange. All members of the exchange have to have securities accounts with the CSD. Whenever two exchange members -a seller and a buyer -are matched on the exchange, the CSD receives automatically from the exchange the instructions to debit the seller's and to credit the buyer's account. This process is called straight through processing (STP).
Special problems arise in case of cross-listed securities if the two exchanges on which the securities are listed use different CSDs for settlement. Assume that an exchange A uses only CSD A and another exchange B uses only CSD B. An investor may wish to sell on exchange B securities held on his account with CSD A. Before he can do that, the securities have to be transferred from CSD A to CSD B. For this purpose, CSDs maintain so-called (direct or indirect) links. Only after the securities have been credited to an account with CSD B, they can be sold on exchange B.
In this paper, we analyse the interactions between exchanges and CSDs in a two-country model. There is an exchange and a CSD in both countries. There are two types of securities, country A securities and country B securities. There are two types of investors, country A and country B investors. Initially, all country A securities are held by country A investors on accounts with CSD A and all country B securities are held by country B investors with CSD B. Initially, all investors are members of their home exchange and CSD, but not of the foreign exchange and CSD. All securities are listed on both exchanges. All trades executed on exchange A must be settled in CSD A and all trades executed on exchange B must be settled in CSD B. The two CSDs maintain a link so that securities can be transferred from one CSD to the other. There are two ways to initiate transactions for example between a country A investor who wants to sell security A and a country B investor who wants to buy security A. Firstly, the A investor offers the securities on exchange A and the B investor orders them on exchange A. Settlement takes place in CSD A and the link is not used. This is relatively costly for the B investor who needs to become (direct or indirect) member of exchange A and CSD A. Secondly, the A investor transfers the securities through the link from CSD A to CSD B and then offers them on exchange B while the B investor orders them on exchange B. This is costly for the A investor who needs to transfer his securities through the link and must become member of exchange A and CSD B. The link transfer is carried out jointly by the two CSDs. A crucial exogenous parameter of the model are the operating costs of the CSDs for providing the link service. Each CSD sets a price the investor has to pay for this service. Furthermore, each exchange sets a price for the execution of trades and each CSD sets a price for the settlement of on-exchange trades. All four service providers are operated by proÞt maximising Þrms.
We analyse four different industry structures: (1) Under complete separation (CS), all four service providers are operated by different independent Þrms and set their prices independently. (2) Under vertical integration (VI), the exchange and the CSD in both countries are operated by the same Þrm and thus coordinate their price setting. (3) Under horizontal integration of the CSDs, both CSDs are operated by the same Þrm. The exchanges are operated independently. We distinguish two stages of horizontal integration: (a) Purely legal integrations (LHI): Though the CSDs are operated by the same Þrm, they are technically still different systems. The transfer of securities through the link entails the same operating costs for the CSD as under CS and VI. But the CSDs set their prices for the link transfer as well as for the settlement of onexchange trades in a coordinated way. (b) Technical integration (THI): Both CSDs are technically merged into one system so that a transfer of securities from one to another CSD does not entail any operating costs. I.e. the operating costs of the link are zero.
Horizontal integration of CSDs may indeed always lead eventually to THI. However, analysing LHI is still not redundant since it helps to distinguish two effects of the transition from CS to THI. This is a pure competition effect illustrated by the transition from CS to LHI. And a cost reduction effect illustrated by the transition from LHI to THI. Any kind of merger may have these two effects. If for example two car makers merge, they may be able to combine their technological expertise and reduce their production costs. This positive cost reduction effect may however be outweighed by a negative competition effect, i.e. the fact that the merger reduces the competition in the car industry. Analysing LHI as an intermediate step in the transition from CS to THI helps to distinguish these two effects of horizontal integration of CSDs.
A welfare comparison of the four industry structures is the center of our attention. The results of this comparison are strikingly simple: VI and LHI entail a (weakly) higher welfare then CS. I.e. the competition effects of the transition from CS to LHI and from CS to VI are positive. If the link operating costs under CS, VI and LHI exceed a certain threshold, then VI entails a higher welfare then LHI so that the competition effect is greater in the transition to VI than in the transition to LHI. If the operating costs of the link under CS, VI and LHI are small than this threshold, then LHI entails a higher welfare then VI, i.e. the competition effect is greater in a transition to LHI. However, THI always entails the highest economic welfare of all four structures. I.e. even if the competition effect of a transition from CS to VI is greater than the competition effect of a transition to THI, the overall welfare improvement is still greatest in case of a transition to THI due to its cost reduction effect.
Before we explain the economic reasons for these results, it is helpful to recall a Þnding from basic industrial economics. 1 Consider a standard Bertrand duopoly. In this setting, a merger of the two Þrms would decrease the economic welfare if the outputs of the Þrms are substitutes (provided that the merger does not reduce production costs). However, if the outputs are complements, then the merger would increase the welfare. The reason is the following: If two Þrms produce substitutes and the price of both Þrms is relatively high, then one Þrm can easily attract more demand by reducing its price a bit and boost up its proÞt. I.e. in equilibrium, both Þrms set relatively low prices. If the Þrms instead produce (perfect) complements, then the demand at both Þrms depends on the sum of the prices of the two goods. Tourists for example consider the sum of the prices for the ßight to a holiday destination and the accommodation there. If the ßight is cheap, they have high demand for hotel rooms even if these are relatively expensive. If now both Þrms set a relatively low price, one Þrm would not loose too much demand even if it increases its price signiÞcantly so that a higher price would 1 See for example Tirole (1988) and Shy (1996) . result in a higher proÞt. I.e. in equilibrium, both Þrms set relatively high prices.
Looking again on our model, we Þnd that the exchange and the CSD of the same country offer perfect complements since trading on the exchange requires settlement in the CSD. This is why VI entails a higher welfare then CS. Now compare LHI and VI. Firstly note that (trading and) settlement in country A and (trading and) settlement in country B are substitutes. I.e. the settlement services of the two CSDs are substitutes. However, the link service provided by CSD A and the link service provided by CSD B are perfect complements. From that perspective, it is not immediately clear whether LHI or VI leads to a higher welfare. The reason why VI leads to a higher welfare than LHI if the link operating costs are high is simple: In this case, transferring securities through the link is too costly, i.e. the link is not used and securities are always traded where they are initially held. Thus, the CSDs in fact do not compete at all, neither in substitutes nor in complements. CS and LHI now lead exactly to the same equilibrium. However, VI leads to lower prices than CS and LHI and thus to a higher welfare because the exchange and the CSD of the same country offer perfect complements. The reason why LHI leads to a higher welfare than VI if the link operating costs are low is more complex and will be discussed in details later.
Finally, it is clear that THI leads to a higher welfare than LHI due to cost reductions. Thus, it is clear that THI is the best if the link operating costs are low since LHI is better than CS and VI in this case. However, if the link operating costs are high, then LHI is not better anymore than VI. But now, the cost reduction effect of THI is even more signiÞcant and THI is still better than all other industry structures.
Our Þndings have obvious implications for the policy discussion on what kind of consolidation may be most desirable for the European securities trading and settlement infrastructure. However, it is important to draw attention to two important limitations of our model. Firstly, we assume that the exchanges cannot choose which CSD they use. Each exchange has to settle on the CSD located in the exchange's country. This assumption clearly reduces the potential competition between the two CSDs signiÞcantly. If under CS, the CSDs were forced to compete with each other for the exchanges, then any type of horizontal integration of the CSDs may result in a negative competition effect. Currently, national exchanges are to a large extend bound to use exclusively the respective national CSD so that our assumption seems to be realistic enough. However, this may change at some point and it would be interesting to analyse the implications of such a change. Secondly we do not allow for OTC trading, i.e. assume that trading exclusively takes place on an exchange. Though this may appear realistic for equities, it is less realistic for bonds.
There is a large body of literature on vertical integration. An overview is in Perry (1989) . Most applications of the theory of vertical integration are on network industries in which a monopolistic upstream Þrm (supplier of a network) produces an essential input for several competing downstream Þrms (users of the network). The main issue is the implications of a vertical merger of the upstream Þrm with one of the downstream Þrms. A prominent example is Vickers (1995) . However, our study largely differs from this literature mainly in the following aspects: there is no analogy of downstream/upstream Þrms in a trading and settlement system. Neither an exchanges nor a CSD takes the other's service as input.
Another body of literature looks at competition among interconnected networks like two operator of mobile phone networks. See for examples Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1996a and 1996b) and Laffont and Tirole (1996) . The situation analysed by this literature somehow resembles the competition between two CSDs connected by a link. However, the literature on competition among interconnected networks focuses mainly on access price regulation while vertical integration is not an issue.
There is some literature on competition, cooperation and consolidation of securities exchanges. Examples are Domowitz (1995) and Shy and Tarkka (2001) . A general discussion of competition among exchanges with a special view to Europe is Di Noia (1998). In this type of literature, exchanges are often considered as networks and consolidation of different networks as a way to pool liquidity in one place. 2 There is currently very little literature on competition and consolidation of different settlement service providers. Examples are the empirical paper by Schmiedel, Malkamaki and Tarkka (2002) , the theoretical work of Holthausen and Tapking (2003) , Kauko (2003) and Koeppl and Monnet (2003) . Kauko (2003) is related to our paper in that it looks at links as devices that create competition between CSDs. Koeppl and Monnet (2003) is to our knowledge the only other paper that looks at exchanges and CSDs in one model. They show in a two-country model with an exchange and a CSD in each country that due to asymmetric information, an efficient merger of the CSDs is difficult to achieve if initially the exchange and the CSD are integrated in both countries.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the assumption of our model. Since our model is a two-stage model, we analyse the two stages in turn in the sections 3 and 4. Section 3 looks at the behavior of investors for given prices of the exchanges and CSDs. Section 4 analyses the price setting behavior of the exchanges and CSDs under the four different industry structures described above. Finally, the welfare implications of the different industry structures are determined in section 5.
The model
In our model, we explicitly refer to arrangement 1 of the previous section. However, we will explain later in this section that we can reinterpret the parameters of our model in a way that allows us to cover to a large extend also most of the other arrangements with our model.
There are two countries A and B. There is a stock exchange in both countries. Furthermore, there is a CSD in both countries. All trades on the stock exchange of country A are settled in the CSD of country A and all trades on the stock exchange of country B are settled in the CSD of country B. For each trade executed on exchange A and then settled in CSD A, both the seller and the buyer has to pay p The two CSDs maintain a bilateral (direct) link which can be used to transfer securities from one CSD to the other. For each transfer, CSD A charges a price q A and CSD B charges q B . Each CSD incurs marginal costs of c L for such transfers.
In each country, there is a group [0; 1] of investors. Each country A investor is member of stock exchange A and of CSD A (i.e. has a securities account in CSD A). Similarly, each country B investor is member of stock exchange B and of CSD B (i.e. has a securities account in CSD B). Initially, no country A investor is member of exchange B or CSD B and no country B investor is member of exchange A or CSD A. However, any investor can decide to become member of the foreign stock exchange and CSD to be able to trade there. For simplicity, we assume that the exchanges and CSDs do not ask for a fee for this remote access. However, the (exogenous) costs for establishing remote access -t T for access to the respective exchange and t S for access to the respective CSD -are borne by the investor. We deÞne t = t T + t S as the overall costs for remote access.
There are two stocks. Stock A has been issued into CSD A and stock B has been issued into CSD B. Both stocks are listed (and quoted) on both exchanges and thus eligible for settlement in both CSDs. Initially, each country A investor owns one share of stock A which is kept on his account with CSD A. Each country B investor owns one share of stock B which is kept on his account with CSD B. Country A investors can sell stock A and buy stock B and country B investors can sell stock B and buy stock A. However, buying or selling abroad requires that the investor Þrst becomes member of the foreign exchange and CSD. Moreover, selling abroad requires that the investor Þrst transfers his share to the foreign CSD.
An investor's beneÞt of holding stocks depends on the location of the investor: For A investor i ∈ [0; 1], the beneÞt of holding one share of stock A is i and the beneÞt of holding one share of stock B is 1 − i. table: 1 u
Whenever we use in this paper symbols with subscripts consisting of two letters, each either A or B (e.g. r AA , BA , S BB ), then the Þrst letter refers to a stock, the second to a country. Here, r AA is the price of stock A in country A, r BA is the price of stock B in country A and r BB and r AB denote the respective prices in country B. If we replace in the table the index A by B and the index B by A wherever A and B occur, we get the beneÞts of country B investor i ∈ [0; 1] for each of his nine alternatives.
Decisions are taken in two steps. First, the two exchanges and the two CSDs simultaneously set the transaction prices p
and -if endogenous -q A and q B . Second, each investor selects one alternative out of his nine alternatives to maximize his beneÞt given all six transaction prices and all four stock prices. Simultaneously, the four stock prices take values such that all four stock markets are in equilibrium.
Note that we explicitely model only one arrangement for cross-border trading and settlement since we assume that (1) the CSDs maintain a direct link and (2) investors always use direct remote access to the foreign exchange and CSD to buy or sell abroad. However, it is easy to show that the parameters of our model can easily be reinterpreted in a way that other arrangements like indirect links between the CSDs and indirect access of investors to foreign infrastructures via an agent bank are also covered.
Stock market equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the stock market equilibrium for given transaction prices. Determining the stock market equilibrium is quite a cumbersome exercise. Firstly, for given stock prices r AA , r BA , r BB and r AB and given transaction prices p , q A and q B , the stock market equilibrium has to be found. A stock market equilibrium for given transaction prices is deÞned as a constellation of stock prices r AA , r BA , r BB and r AB such that
Here, AA , AB , BA and BB are the equilibrium trading volumes in the four stock markets.
However, we show in Appendix B that with this deÞnition, there are under some parameter constellations multiple stock market equilibria with different trading volumes. For this reason, we apply the following reÞnement: If p A 6 = p B , there may be two equilibria -one characterized by BB = AB = 0 and another by AA = BA = 0. In this case, we select the former if p A < p B and the latter if p A > p B . If p A = p B , there may be inÞnitely many equilibria. In this case, we select the one characterized by AA = BB and AB = BA . This reÞnement ensures that we have to consider exactly one equilibrium for most parameter constellation given by the following two propositions.
Proposition 1 If t ≥ q, then the stock market equilibrium for given transaction prices is characterised by the following trading volumes:
If t is relatively high and q relatively low, then the link is relatively cheap and becoming a member of the exchange and the CSD of the foreign country is relatively expensive. In this case, we Þnd that the investors are very sensitive regarding the difference between p A and p B . As soon as these prices are not equal, all stocks are transferred via the link from the country with the higher to the country with the lower trading and settlement price and all trade takes place in the country with the lower price. I.e. trading and settlement in country A and trading and settlement in country B are perfect substitutes.
Note that if p A = p B , all linear combinations of the trading volumes under I) and II) would characterize an equilibrium if we did not use the above reÞnement. Since we have AA = BA = AB = BB for p A = p B , half of the trading country A investors sell in country B and half of the trading country B investors sell in country A. These are the investors who use the link. Furthermore, it follows that these and only these investors buy abroad. I.e. every trading investor either uses the link by himself or trades with an investor who uses the link. And those investors who do not use the link do not become member of the foreign exchange and the foreign CSD. I.e. for given trading volumes, remote membership is created as little as possible and the link is used as much as possible. In equilibrium, we Þnd that r AB = r BA > r AA = r BB , i.e. the investors who use the link are compensated by favorable stock prices for the additional transaction costs they bear.
The situation looks very different in case that t ≤ q:
Proposition 2 If t ≤ q, then the stock market equilibrium for given transaction prices is characterised by the following trading volumes:
If t is relatively low and q relatively high, the link is relatively expensive and becoming a member of the foreign exchange and CSD is relatively cheap. In this case, we Þnd that AA and BB are positive and AB = BA = 0, if the difference between p A and p B is moderate. I.e. investors from both countries become members of the respectively foreign exchange and CSD and the link is not used. Stock A is traded only in country A and stock B is traded only in country B. Only if the difference between p A and p B is sufficiently high, all stocks are transferred via the link from the country with the higher to the country with the lower trading and settlement price and all trade takes place in the country with the lower price. I.e. trading and settlement in country A and trading and settlement in country B are now imperfect substitutes. 3 
Transaction price equilibrium
After determining the stock market trading volumes in equilibrium for given transaction prices, we now look at the Þrst stage of the model. Here, the transactions prices are set by the two exchanges and the two CSDs.
Payoff functions
To begin with, we deÞne the payoff functions of the players. The proÞt function of exchange A is deÞned by
and for exchange B, we get
Note that an exchange receives the price p T A or p T B twice for each trade executed because both the seller and the buyer have to pay the price. This is way the trading quantities are multiplied by 2. However, c T is deÞned as the costs of the exchange for executing a trade.
For the CSDs, we get
The Þrst term refers to the proÞts from settling trades on the respective exchange, while the second term refers to proÞts from operating the link. Since we are going to look at different industry structures, we deÞne
as the proÞt of a company operating both the exchange and the CSD in the respective country (vertical integration of exchange and CSD). The proÞt of a company operating both CSDs would be
In the following three sections, we analyse the equilibrium transaction prices and trading volumes under different industry structures. However, before we enter into the analysis, a few things should be noted.
First, for any given parameter constellation, there is a multiplicity of no-trade equilibria which we will ignore. Assume that both exchanges set prices that are so high that the demand for trade would be zero even if both settlement (and link) prices are zero. It is clear that any settlement prices are best responses of the operators of the CSDs. Analogously, assume that both CSDs set settlement prices that are so high that the demand for trade would be zero even if both trading prices are zero. Now any trading prices are best responses of the exchanges. Thus, there are always equilibria with no trade and prohibitively high prices for trading and settlement. Since such equilibria describe extreme coordination failures and characterize hardly interesting trading allocations, we ignore them.
Second, under certain circumstances there are equilibria in which the marginal costs for trading and/or for the settlement of trades are higher than the respective prices (i.e. p c T ). We ignore these equilibria, too. Finally, to avoid corner solutions in equilibrium, we assume ® ≥ 0 and¯≥ 0 with
Complete separation
To begin with, we look at an industry in which all four service providers are operated independently by different companies. We concentrate on symmetric equilibria only, i.e. equilibria with p Proposition 3 There is one and only one symmetric equilibrium in which the link is used if t − 2c L > 2®.
(
, then there is no symmetric equilibrium in which the link is used.
First note that only if the operating costs c L of the link are low, there is an equilibrium in which the link is used. Note also that in this equilibria, both the trading and the settlement prices are equal to marginal costs. The reason is that if c L is low, so are the prices q A and q B for the link and it is cheap to substitute trading and settlement in one country for trading and settlement in the other country. The exchange and the CSD in country A enter into perfect price competition with the exchange and CSD in country B. This leads to a situation in which the prices equal marginal costs. Note that part (2) of the proposition describes corner cases with q A = q B = 1 2 t. According to proposition 3, an equilibrium in which the link is used exists only if t − 2c L > 2®. However, there is always an equilibrium in which the link is not used:
Proposition 4 There are always symmetric equilibria in which the link is not used. The set of all such equilibria is characterised by
One might not be surprised to Þnd an equilibrium in which the link is not used, if c L is high. It is also not a surprise that in such an equilibrium, trading and settlement prices are higher than marginal costs since there is no (direct)
Thus, we do not have a unique equilibrium, if t−2c L > 2®. However, there are good reasons to select in this case the equilibrium described in proposition 3. Firstly, it is easy to show that the CSDs reach a higher proÞt in the equilibrium described in proposition 3 than in the one of proposition 4. Secondly, we have argued in the previous subsection that we do not consider equilibria in which there is no trade at all due to coordination failures. For the same reasons, we can ignore the equilibria of proposition 4 in case that t − 2c L > 2®. I.e. from now on, we assume that the CSDs coordinate on the equilibrium described in proposition 3 whenever t − 2c L > 2®.
Vertical Integration
We now assume that in both countries the CSD and the exchange are operated by the same Þrm. The operator of the silo in country A sets p The economic intuition for this result is of course the same as for proposition 3.
As under complete separation, there is always an equilibrium in which the link is not used:
Proposition 6 There are always symmetric equilibria in which the link is not used. The set of all such equilibria is characterised by
for some number g ≥ 1 2 t.
Note that the trading and settlement prices are lower in the equilibrium of proposition 6 than in the one of proposition 4. The reason is that the CSD and the exchange of a given country offer complements. As explained in the introduction, mergers of Þrms that offer complements reduce prices.
Again, we do not have a unique equilibrium if t − 2c L > 2®. But it is again easy to see that the CSD's proÞts are higher in the equilibrium described in proposition 5 than in the one of proposition 6. For that reason and because proposition 6 describes equilibria that are due to coordination failures if c L is low, we assume again that the CSDs coordinate on the equilibrium described in proposition 5 whenever t − 2c L > 2®.
Horizontal integration of CSDs
We now look at a horizontally integrated structure, i.e. the two CSDs are operated by one company. In this case, we have three players. The operator of exchange A sets p 
2) For t−2c L < 0, the set of all symmetric equilibria is characterised by
If c L is low, i.e. t − 2c L > 0, then q is low and the two exchanges enter into perfect price competition that leads to a situation in which the trading prices are equal to marginal costs. However, the prices for settlement and for the link are not unique. The reason is subtle, but important to note. As we have discussed after proposition 1, every investor who trades either uses the link by himself or trades with an investor who uses the link, if q is low (t ≥ q). I.e. (trading and) settlement in some country on the one hand and the link services on the other are indirectly perfect substitutes. Trading and settlement requires using the link. For that reason, investors are not concerned with the settlement price and the link price, but with the (weighed) sum of both, i.e. q + 4p c S . It is immediate that the propositions 3 and 5 would still hold and that proposition 7, part (1) would also remain unchanged, but q =¯+ 2c L . I.e. q would now be lower than under complete separation and vertical integration. The reason is that the link services of the CSDs are complements. As explained in the introduction, mergers of Þrms that offer complements reduce prices. With that, it is clear that q+4p S A is lower under horizontal integration than under complete separation and vertical integration, if t − 2c L > 0. 4 Finally, if t − 2c L < 0, then the link is to expensive to be used and purely legal horizontal integration and complete separation lead to the same results. Now consider a complete technical integration of the CSDs. I.e. the two CSDs are operated on the same system and the operating costs of the link are thus c L = 0, while t S = 0 as well. Furthermore, it may be assumed that q = 0. The equilibrium for this case now follows directly from part (1) of proposition 7. We get p 
Welfare analysis
We now compare the welfare characteristics of the different industry structures discussed above. We Þrst determine the general net social beneÞt function and than calculate the net social beneÞts for the different industry structures. 
Net social beneÞt function
Those country A investors who buy stock B have a beneÞt of doing this of
On top of that, country A investors who trade in country B must get connected to country B. Note the following: Each investor who want to trade in country B needs to get connected to country B only once, even if he trades both stocks in country B. Furthermore, a situation in which some country A investors trade in country B only stock A and some other country A investors trade in country B only stock B is not possible. I.e. the overall number of country A investors who get connected to country B is max{ BB ; AB } and the costs for country A investors from getting connected to country B are thus given by t max{ BB ; AB }. The net beneÞt of country A investors is given by the sum of these three Þrst components minus t max{ BB ; AB }, i.e. by
We get the net beneÞts B A of country B investors in a similar way. The net beneÞts of the economy as a whole is given by
It is easy to show that a welfare maximum under the constraints AA = BB and AB = BA and under the relations described in the propositions 1 and 2 is deÞned by p A = p B = c S and q = 2c L (prices equal to marginal costs).
Comparison of social beneÞts for different industry structures
Taking now the results from the previous section, it is easy to calculate the net social beneÞts for the different industry structures. For CS, it is given by
In a similar way, we Þnd for VI
Finally, we have
The comparison of the net social beneÞts is straightforward and even for t S = 0 given by
To understand this result, we only have to compare equilibrium prices since it is clear that the lower the equilibrium prices the higher the social beneÞts. However, the intuition for the differences in equilibrium prices for the different industry structures has been discussed already in section 4.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the welfare implications of different structures of the securities trading and settlement industry in a twocountry model. The result of our analysis is remarkably simple: Complete horizontal integration of CSDs leads to a higher welfare than vertical integration of exchanges and CSDs and vertical integration leads to a higher welfare than complete separation.
However, before Þnal policy conclusions can be drawn, two limitations of the model mentioned already in the introduction need to be emphasized again: Firstly, we assume that the CSDs cannot compete for the exchanges, i.e. each exchange is forced to settle all trades in the domestic CSD. And secondly, we do not allow for OTC trading (including internalization of trades by a custodian bank), i.e. all trades are executed on an exchange. Both assumptions might have inßuenced our results. It is left to future research to look at the welfare implications of horizontal and vertical integration in securities trading and settlement from other angles.
Finally, it should be emphasized that we did not look at horizontal integration of exchanges. If we had done that in our model, we would probably have come to the conclusion that exchanges should not merge since they offer substitutes. However, there may still be good reasons why exchanges should merge which are not taken into account in our model. For example, mergers of exchanges lead to a concentration of liquidity. This liquidity concentration effect however does not occur in our model.
Appendix A
In this appendix, the demand and supply functions of the investors for given transaction prices and stock prices are determine. Each investor selects the alternative that gives him the highest beneÞt according to the tables in section 2. Note that in the beneÞts for the alternatives 2 to 5, the name i of the respective investor does not occur, i.e. all investors located in the same country have the same preferences over these four alternatives. Similarly, all investors located in the same country have the same preferences over the alternatives 6 to 9. To begin with, we look at the country A investors and have to consider several cases:
(1) u 
Note that u From this, we get the supply and demand functions as follows:
Here, S AA is the supply of stock A in country A, S AB is the supply of stock A in country B and D BA and D BB denote the respective demand for stock B. 
Note that u 
As one would expect, S AA is increasing in r AA , D BA is decreasing in r BA and both functions are decreasing in p A . Note that we do not necessarily
For the next two cases, we get the supply and demand in a very similar way:
(2) u 
For the last case, matters are somewhat more complicated: (4) u 
Here, we have ® 1 +® 9 = 2® 8 , i.e. ® 1 −® 8 = ® 8 −® 9 . We have to consider two sub-sub-cases:
Here, all investors i ∈ [0; ® 9 ] choose alternative 9, all investors i ∈ [® 9 ; ® 1 ] choose alternative 2 and all investors i ∈ [® 1 ; 1] choose alternative 1. From this, we get the supply function for stock A and demand functions for stock B as follows:
The next three sub-cases are very similar: (4b) u (4b1) ® 6 ≥ ® 10 ≡ 1 − r BB − p B . We now get: 
We get the same result as in the cases (4a2) and (4b2).
(4d) u i;A }. We consider the following two subsub-cases:
We get the same result as in the cases (4a2), (4b2) and (4c2).
Finally, there are several other cases we do not discuss in details but which are important and have to be kept in mind. These are cases where all investors are indifferent between at least two alternatives from 6 to 9 (or from 2 to 5). If for example u i;A }, we Þnd that the supply and demand may be given by any linear combination of the supply and demand functions of the cases (1) and (2) . The Þndings for other cases are similar.
Appendix B
Proof of propositions 1 and 2:
Proving these three proposition is very tedious, though not difficult. We therefore do not discuss the entire proof in details, but rather look at a few cases only. Other cases can be dealt with in a similar way. To derive the equilibrium stock prices and trading turnovers on the four stock markets, we have to consider again several cases. We Þrst consider cases in which both stocks are traded:
(A) Assume that the conditions for case (1) in Appendix A are given, i.e. u , then
An equilibrium would require S AA = D AA and D BA = S BA . Note that
This is an equilibrium if (t + q) all conditions above are fulÞlled. It is easy to show that this leads after a few considerations to the following result: 
This is an equilibrium if (t + q) all conditions above (including the two conditions for case (1)) are fulÞlled. However, the condition r BA − (q A + q B ) ≥ 1 − r AA implies (q A + q B ) ≤ 0 which is in general not possible.
(A3) Analogous to case (4c2) above, we consider the case that u 
Summary of the cases (A1) to (A4):
Comparing the results for the cases (A1), (A3) and (A4), we can easily see that the conditions given in (A1) are broader than those in (A3) and in (A4). I.e. we can summarize these results as follows:
, AB = BB = 0 is an equilibrium (A5) Analogous to case (4b1) above, we consider u i;B }. We Þnd in a way similar to those used above
, AB = BA = 0 is an equilibrium (C) Assume that the conditions for case (3) of Appendix A and the analogous conditions for country B investors are given, i.e. u 
, BA = AA = 0 is an equilibrium Note that the conditions for the Þrst sub-case in case (D) and those for the cases (A1) to (A4) overlap partially. The same holds for the conditions for the second sub-case in case (D) and those for case (A6). I.e. we may have multiple equilibria. In these cases, we apply or equilibrium reÞnement as described in section 3. If p A < p B , we select the equilibrium described in (A1) to (A4) or (A6). If p A > p B , we select the equilibrium described in (D). If p A = p B , we select the allocation described in proposition 1. It is easy to show that this is an equilibrium allocation though we have not discussed this equilibrium here.
It is easy to see that the results produced so far give us a proof of the propositions 1 and 2. c T cannot be the case in equilibrium, because each exchange could do better by slightly decreasing its price and on that way attracting all the trade. Now assume q ≤ t and p
c S cannot be the case in equilibrium, because each CSD could do better by slightly decreasing its price and on that way attracting all the settlement of exchange trades. Thus, the following holds: If there is a symmetric equilibrium in which the link is used (and p
c S as given. Maximising ¼ 1 with respect to q A under the restriction q ≤ t and then assuming q A = q B gives q A = q B = min{
c L }. Thus, the following holds: If there is a symmetric equilibrium in which the link is used, then it is characterised by q A = q B = min{ . Now we show that no other strategy would give CSD A a higher proÞt. . Since the constrained maximization cannot lead to a higher proÞt, choosing a response characterised by p 
. Since the constrained maximization cannot lead to a higher proÞt, choosing a response characterised by p ® 2 because such a response would imply that CSD A does not settle exchange trades but makes proÞt only from the link which is hardly used because q is high. Thus, it is clear that there always exist a number f such that all constellations with p (1 − t − c T + 2c S ) and q A = q B ≥ f are equilibria in which the link is not used. ¥
Proof of proposition 5:
The proof is very similar to that of proposition 3 and therefore omitted.
¥
Proof of proposition 6:
The proof is very similar to that of proposition 4 and therefore omitted. ¥
Proof of proposition 7:
(1) We Þrst determine the best response of the operator of the CSDs on p We now maximize ¼ S under the constraint q ≥ t. We have 
